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Mr. Chairman, let us be done with vacillation, with weasel words, with paralysis of will, with alibis for nonaction. Let us reject the slanderous sophistry that the people's call for bold leadership is only the bleating of helplessness frustration. Let us reject the fool's talk that because we stand freedom's guard on borders distant from our shores, we must, in polite exchange, permit the breaching of our own inner defenses.

Mr. Chairman, let us reject the paltrying premise that we dare not fire a shot in Cuba lest it bring a tyrant's echoing shot in Berlin or elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, let us bluntly proclaim to the world that we need the consent of no nation or organization of nations to act for our own self-preservation.

I say to the Members of this House, if we do less, we shall delude ourselves, confuse and betray our Nation, dismay our friends, embolden our enemies, heighten our great peril, and make infinitely more costly and precarious the ultimate showdown when we or our hard-pressed successors face a final choice between courage and capitulation.

Mr. Chairman, let us heed one other ancient admonition: "Stand fast; quit you like men, be strong."

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. SELDEN).

(Mr. SELDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Chairman, I view the resolution before the House of Representatives today as an expression of support for the President of the United States in whatever action he deems necessary to meet the growing Cuban crisis.

Let us not delude ourselves, however, that determined words can substitute for determined action. With this resolution Congress is simply reflecting the concern of the American people over the loss of foreign policy initiative in our own hemisphere. What is needed is action to regain that initiative.

Only the President can decide what form and degree this action should take. However, as I interpret the meaning of this resolution, the Congress is stating its belief that action is needed—in short, that we can no longer afford a policy of drift-and-wait where Cuba is concerned.

We cannot allow the Kremlin to hold the initiative for action in our own hemisphere without jeopardizing our position throughout the world. It is not enough to be satisfied that Soviet activities in Cuba present no immediate threat to our security. We must anticipate that the establishment of such a threat—if in fact it does not already exist—is the Communist aim in Cuba. That aim cannot be thwarted by continuing a policy of drift-and-wait.

While some may disagree with the wording of the resolution before us today, I think most will agree that it represents congressional recognition of the need for action and our support of the President in any efforts he may make to

meet this need. Therefore, I urge the resolution's passage and I trust that it will receive an overwhelming vote of approval, thereby giving unmistakable evidence to our allies, the Castro government and the Kremlin, of the unity of the American people on this very vital issue.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY).

(Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) WILLIAM G.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, it has been more than 17 months since the ill-fated landing by Cuban patriots at the Bay of Pigs, but that disaster is not forgotten.

To the contrary, perhaps no other single event in recent years has so plagued and embarrassed the United States as that landing on April 17, 1961, and this embarrassment continues to grow month by month. We find that the incessant taunts coming from Castro and the brazen involvement of the Soviet Union in Cuban affairs will not let the unhappy story of the Bay of Pigs landing slip into oblivion.

While many points of this invasion are clear, there are some facts that are still clouded with mystery and the interest of the American people in this matter is apparently still increasing.

I have collected the information which is available on the Bay of Pigs invasion. None of this information was obtained from any secret Government sources. The following is as accurate an account of this incident as I could find from the information available.

As it became evident by 1960 that Castro was a part of the Communist conspiracy, was a bitter enemy of this country, was with Russian assistance violating the Monroe Doctrine, was guilty of many overt acts of hostility toward us and was organizing a hostile Russian Communist military force within 90 miles of our country, there was a growing demand in the United States that some action be taken.

Thousands of Cubans had fled Castro's Communist tyranny and demanded a chance to return to Cuba and recover their country. President Eisenhower was sympathetic to the idea and directed the Central Intelligence Agency to consider plans to assist these Cuban patriots. Richard Bissell of the CIA was given the job of planning to assist the Cuban refugees.

These refugees were organized into a military landing force to deliver Cuba from the Communists. The operation was to be known as Operation Pluto. It was given—or leased, the exact nature of the transfer is not clear—surplus American military equipment including some World War II ships, a few transport planes and B-26's, the latter being a type of two-engine bombers used in World War II. The training of this expeditionary force commenced near the town of Retalhuleu in Guatemala.

After the election in 1960, President Eisenhower acquainted President-elect Kennedy with the plan for this opera-

tion and told him, in effect, that the operation was now in his hands and he could, of course, abandon it or proceed with it as he saw fit. Kennedy then brought Adolf Berle, Jr., former Ambassador to Brazil under President Roosevelt, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., into the picture. Among those present when Kennedy called his first large meeting on this operation were: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Adolf Berle and McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. At a later meeting on April 4, 1961, President Kennedy also invited, among others, Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon. Kennedy stated at this meeting that he would make a decision soon about what, if anything, would be done regarding the proposed Cuban invasion. The military apparently had little to do with the later phases of this operation.

The following morning, April 8, 1961, Kennedy made his decision to proceed with the invasion, but with changes. He would not permit any assistance from American jets. This decision greatly limited the chances for the success of this operation, for an amphibious operation would be futile without sufficient air support. The B-26's which had been turned over to the expeditionary forces would be based in Central America, 500 miles away, and could only operate 45 minutes over the Cuban airfields before being forced to return for fuel. Castro's planes, however, would be able to stay in the air for much longer periods because of the short time necessary to travel to and from their landing fields to refuel.

On April 12, 1961, President Kennedy stated that not "under any conditions" would the United States interfere with forces in Cuba and that statement was released to the press. Such a statement would naturally discourage any patriots in Cuba who would be expected to aid in the overthrow of Castro. This same statement was emphasized by Secretary of State Rusk on the night before the landing and a statement of similar import was made by Adlai Stevenson, our Ambassador to the United Nations.

Kennedy had decided that he would not allow the B-26 bombers being used by the Cuban rebels to make more than two air strikes against the Castro air force. The first was to be made on April 15, 2 days before the landing, and the other was to be made the morning of the landing. There has been no explanation made as to why the air strikes should have been limited to two. We had turned these B-26 bombers over to the invasion forces, and it would naturally be supposed that they should be used to win the invasion most effectively. If three or four air strikes were needed to insure victory why should we restrict the strike to a point where only half the job would be done? This decision cer-